Mode Shift and Demand Management
With 28.85% of all measures, mode shift and demand management stands out as the most frequently cited category. Over 100 countries include it, with Canada, Sri Lanka, Cabo Verde, Azerbaijan, and Uganda among the top five representatives.
The prominence of mode shift is at first encouraging: reducing reliance on cars and promoting public transport, cycling, and walking are indispensable for sustainable urban mobility. Yet, the critical question is whether these commitments amount to concrete structural reforms or remain vague aspirations. Many countries’ NDCs mention “encouraging public transport” without addressing the entrenched subsidies for road infrastructure or the socio-political power of the car industry.
Moreover, the global North–South divide is evident. Countries like Canada highlight demand management as a measurable pathway, but this is often paired with continuing expansion of highways and airports domestically. Meanwhile, smaller nations such as Cabo Verde and Sri Lanka frame demand management as part of survival strategies against oil dependency, highlighting a different logic: not climate ambition per se, but economic vulnerability.
The critical issue is that mode shift is politically easy to endorse but structurally difficult to deliver. By featuring so prominently, it risks becoming a rhetorical placeholder—widely cited, thinly implemented.
Electrification
Electrification measures account for 19.47% of the total, with 96 countries including them. Canada leads with 15 references, followed by the UAE, Colombia, Dominica, and the Bahamas.
Electrification has become the poster child of transport decarbonisation, particularly in high-income countries. Electric vehicles (EVs) signal technological modernity and attract significant donor financing. However, the critical issue is that electrification measures in NDCs often ignore systemic challenges:
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The electricity grid’s reliance on fossil fuels in many countries undermines emission reduction claims.
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The social dimension is neglected: EV adoption predominantly benefits elites in urban centres.
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The lifecycle emissions of battery production and disposal rarely feature in NDCs.
What we see in the dashboards is not simply climate ambition but the political attractiveness of EVs. For oil-rich states like the UAE, electrification can co-exist with continued fossil fuel exports. For countries like Dominica and the Bahamas, citing electrification in NDCs signals alignment with global discourses—even when the practical infrastructure (charging networks, grid stability) is limited.
Thus, while electrification is important, its prominence in NDCs reflects a narrow technological optimism rather than a comprehensive mobility strategy.
Transport System Improvements
At 17.19%, transport system improvements represent a middle ground, cited by 69 countries. The leaders—Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Suriname, Azerbaijan, and Canada—suggest a mix of developing and developed contexts.
This category is perhaps the most pragmatic, encompassing investments in logistics efficiency, better infrastructure integration, and improved urban transport systems. Unlike mode shift (which focuses on behavioural change) or electrification (focused on vehicles), system improvements address the efficiency of existing networks.
Yet here too the risk is superficiality. Improvements are frequently listed in NDCs as catch-all solutions—modernising fleets, digitalising logistics—without detail on scale, funding, or regulation. For instance, “improved freight logistics” can mean anything from digital apps to massive rail investment. The ambiguity makes it difficult to hold countries accountable.
A further critique is that system improvements are often donor-driven, especially in developing countries where international development banks finance transport modernisation projects. This risks producing NDCs that reflect external financing pipelines rather than locally prioritised needs.
Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency appears in 14.92% of measures, with 78 countries referencing it. The leaders—Morocco, Suriname, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, and Colombia—illustrate its adoption across diverse regions.
Energy efficiency is notable because it is simultaneously commonsensical and marginalised. Few would argue against reducing fuel consumption through improved vehicle standards or maintenance. Yet its relatively low share suggests that efficiency is less politically visible compared to EVs or alternative fuels.
One explanation is that efficiency lacks the symbolic capital of new technology. Unlike EVs, which can be showcased as innovation, efficiency often requires regulatory enforcement (fuel economy standards, inspections) that challenge entrenched industry interests. In many developing countries, weak enforcement capacity makes efficiency commitments aspirational at best.
The irony is that energy efficiency delivers quick, cost-effective emission reductions, yet it receives less attention than more glamorous solutions. This illustrates the political economy of visibility: what matters is not what works best, but what signals ambition.
Alternative Fuels
With 13.34%, alternative fuels rank even lower. Only 79 countries include them, with Dominica, Brazil, Canada, Argentina, and Namibia among the top five.
Here the clustering with electrification is revealing. Both categories speak to the substitution of fossil fuels, yet the political narratives differ. Alternative fuels (biofuels, hydrogen, synthetic fuels) are often framed as national pride projects: Brazil’s biofuels, Argentina’s ethanol, Namibia’s hydrogen. Unlike EVs, which rely on global supply chains, alternative fuels are promoted as domestic solutions.
Yet critical challenges abound:
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The sustainability of biofuels is contested, with land-use change often undermining net benefits.
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Hydrogen requires massive renewable capacity that many countries lack.
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For small states like Dominica, citing alternative fuels in NDCs risks becoming symbolic signalling, disconnected from implementation capacity.
Alternative fuels thus reflect energy geopolitics more than climate effectiveness.
Aviation and Maritime
At just 6.23%, aviation and maritime measures are the least represented, with only 30 countries mentioning them. Türkiye, Kiribati, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, and Cabo Verde lead this category.
The marginality of aviation and maritime is alarming given that these modes account for significant shares of global emissions. Their absence reflects both the political sensitivity of addressing international transport and the jurisdictional complexity: emissions are often excluded from national inventories, falling instead under the remit of ICAO and IMO.
For small island states like Kiribati and Cabo Verde, aviation and shipping are lifelines. Their inclusion in NDCs reflects existential concerns about connectivity. Yet for major emitters, silence is strategic: avoiding commitments in hard-to-abate sectors protects powerful industries.
The critical takeaway is that the lowest-emphasised category is among the most urgent, exposing the gap between climate needs and political will.
Clusters, Contradictions, and Priorities
When viewed together, the categories reveal implicit hierarchies of attention. Mode shift, electrification, and system improvements dominate; efficiency, fuels, and international transport trail behind.
Two critical clusters emerge:
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Electrification + Alternative Fuels: These categories highlight a technological substitution logic, focused on vehicles and fuels rather than systemic change. Their combined share (32.8%) reflects global enthusiasm for supply-side fixes, often aligned with industry lobbying.
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Mode Shift + System Improvements + Efficiency: Together, these categories (61%) reflect demand-side and efficiency approaches. Yet their practical implementation is harder, explaining why they are rhetorically present but less operationalised.
The overall picture is a snapshot of political feasibility rather than climate necessity. Countries prioritise what is visible, fundable, and politically safe. Aviation and maritime are avoided, efficiency is under-emphasised, and electrification dominates discourse.
Conclusion
The picture that emerges from countries’ NDCs is not one of coherent or comprehensive planning, but of selective prioritisation shaped by political feasibility, technological optimism, and the influence of global narratives. Measures such as electrification and alternative fuels are highlighted because they are visible, fundable, and align with dominant industry discourses, even when their actual effectiveness or accessibility is questionable. By contrast, harder but often more impactful areas—such as improving energy efficiency, regulating freight logistics, or tackling aviation and maritime emissions—receive minimal attention.
This imbalance suggests that NDCs currently function less as roadmaps for deep transformation and more as signals of alignment with prevailing climate rhetoric. For developing countries, measures often reflect donor-driven agendas; for wealthier states, they provide a means to showcase innovation while avoiding politically difficult choices. Ultimately, the distribution of transport measures tells us more about what governments are comfortable promising than about what is necessary to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.
If NDCs are to drive genuine decarbonisation in transport, they must move beyond symbolic and selective measures. This requires confronting neglected sectors like aviation and maritime, embedding energy efficiency and demand management into enforceable policy, and ensuring that technological solutions are complemented by systemic change. Without this shift, the transport sector will remain one of the largest obstacles to delivering a truly sustainable future.
About
If you have any questions or would like to share how you used the data, please contact Nikola Medimorec at nikola.medimorec@slocatpartnership.org or María Belén Vásquez at maria.vasquez1@giz.de.
* We consider all NDC submissions made since November 2024 to be part of the third generation of NDCs, regardless of the document’s title or version number. Therefore, the findings may differ from those of other NDC 3.0 trackers.
Resources on transport in NDCs
Third-generation NDCs (publications since 2024):
Second-generation NDCs (publications from 2022/23):
First-generation NDCs (publications from 2016-18):
