Public Transport Organisation in Germany Contract awarding and management



Transit Alliance and Contract-based Transit Service

13. July 2016, Foshan Marc Gorter, Dennis Günthel



Agenda Contracting in Public Transport

- 1. Fundamental questions
- 2. Awarding PT contracts
- 3. Managing PT contracts



Fundamental questions Contract obligation and tendering principle

European Regulation requires

- conclusion of a *Public* Service Contract and
- in principle its *competitive awarding*, but with direct award exceptions

In Europe and Germany increasingly commercial companies competing for tendered services with financial compensation

City Transportation still mainly by direct award to municipal operator

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Fundamental questions **Public Service Contract – Basic Principle**

former PT financing

contractual financing



Fundamental questions

Important issues at the start of contract design

To achieve a good contract in the end, start off contract design by clearing aims and other fundamental issues!

- Aims: What shall be achieved?
- **Scope** of the services to be delivered?
 - Operations / provision of infrastructure / vehicles
 - Modes: subarban rail, metro, tram, bus, ...
- Appropriate allocation of competences and duties? Operator merely carrier or also PT management / coordination tasks?
- Which partner can / shall bear which risk?
 - Investment and financing costs vehicles, infrastructure
 - Operational costs personnel, fuel/energy, …
 - Revenue risks gross und net cost contracts
- Contract duration dep. on modes, assets, planning (un)-certainties



substantial impact on service obligations and monitoring!

Fundamental questions Typical policy aims related to public transport





Fundamental questions Scope of the contract

	Bus	Tram	Metro
Operations			
Vehicles	Germany 8	Germany & Europe: numerous models & vari- ations; need for further development especially regarding infrastructure provision / maintenance	
Infrastructure	regarding in		
	regularing in		, mainteendinee

Exemplary considerations

- Combine modes in 1 contract (licence) if operator shall have PT management competencies and carry revenue risks
- Separate bus networks from rail (and split into subnetworks) if competitive pressure in operations tendering is wanted
- Natural monopoly rail infrastructure shall be separated from rail operations tenders
- Separating vehicle provision from operations increases competitive pressure, but also leads to more interfaces and complexity

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Fundamental questions **Classification of contract regimes**



Source: Ringqvist, Stenerik (2010): "The Swedish Experience". Presentation. Six months experience of the PSO regulation. UITP Conference. Paris, 7 June 2010; adapted. CIII



Fundamental questions Who should be responsible for which tasks?

	Foshan City	District Transport Community	PT operator
Setting of PT objectives and targets			
Design of PT network and routes			
Setting the requirements concerning			
service hours and service frequencies			
the vehicle/fleet quality	 Categories e.g.: Decision, advice, coordination, participation/discussion, Basic standards vs. elaborations 		
service reliability/punctuality			ation,
friendliness of the staff			 trations
Timetables			
Setting the fare structure and level			
Setting the sales structures			
Information/Communication			
Operation of the services			



Fundamental questions **Risk allocation – production costs**

In principle, the operator shall carry production cost risks

But: Price adjustment if relevant input factors change, e.g.:

- Fixed price per timetable km or hr, adaptation in line with labour and fuel costs development (e.g. national or province indices)
- Annual adjustment of price [¥ / timetable km] or [¥ / timetable hr] according to calculation sheet (as delivered with the offer)

Only external influences shall lead to price adjustments!

And: PTA may decide to take over further risks if they are considered to be too high / too uncertain for operators

- reduction of risk premium
- stimulating the number of competing operators



Fundamental questions Some basic options for price adjustments



- **1** constant budget for contract term
- increasing budget for contract term based on calculation (e.g. 1% per year; includes risk premium)
 - flexible budget = constant basic budget plus price adjustment for certain input factors (e.g. fuel)

Fundamental questions Revenue risk - Net vs. Gross Cost Contract



Net Cost Contract Costs are covered by • Fare revenue and • Contractual payment revenue risk borne by transport operator

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Fundamental questions **Net cost contracts - prerequisites**

Prerequisites for a (well functioning) net cost contract

- High passenger / revenue potential
- Reliable long term transport policy and PT supply strategy
- Calculability of external influences (e.g. inhabitants Foshan and surroundings, factory areas and working places)
- Overall network or big subnetwork, demand mainly independent of other (sub)networks
- Long contract duration
- Tariff development defined in advance (or at least agreements on revenue effects of fare changes; elasticity → next slide)
- Fair, transparent and fast revenue distribution (→ presentation "Transport Associations")



Fundamental questions

Net cost contracts – Advantages, drawbacks

+ Maria

- Market incentive for operator initiative, good services and quality
- "Lean" quality management



- Prerequisites (see previous slide) hardly ever fulfillable
- If fulfilled for the most part, major operator risks remain
 - high risk premium
 - high market entry barrier

Appealing in principle but major drawbacks in practice Observation: general plead of PT companies for revenue responsibility, but lower participation in net cost tenders



Fundamental questions

Contract design: options to describe PT services

Functional	Intermediate	Constructive	
Specification of the service output	Minimum standards and supporting guidelines	Detailed specification of the service input	
Examples:			
Purely functional	Functional elements (intermediate)	Purely constructive	
Maximum travel time of 15 minutes from a bus stop to the city centre (within a densely populated area)	There has to be a direct service from the central station to the Exhibition Ground.	Line A leaves from the central station via [list of all stops] for the Exhibition Ground.	
90% of the stations in the central district have to offer departures at least every half hour.	Buses have to be operated every 20 minutes during off-peak-periods (Monday to Friday).	The first departure from the central station (Monday to Friday) is at 5:05, the second at 05:25	
The waiting period at the central station shall not exceed 15 minutes for 80% of the passengers.	There has to be a seat for every passenger with a travel time exceeding 15 minutes. There are the following capacity restrictions: 	The line has to be operated with low-floor articulated 4-door buses with a minimum of 63 seats.	
75% of all passengers have to be satisfied with the cleanliness of the buses.	The vehicles are clean at the start of the line. Solid waste has to be removed at the end of the line.	Vehicles have to be cleaned daily. Solid waste has to be removed at the line end.	
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Agenda Contracting in Public Transport

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2. Awarding PT contracts

3. Managing PT contracts



Awarding PT contracts

Market entry – Reg. EC 1370 and German PT law

Authority initiative vs. market initiative

- Market entry depends on **authorisation** and, if financial compensation is necessary, on the award of a **contract***
- **Two different public authorities** are responsible:
 - the regulatory authority ("Genehmigungsbehörde") for authorisation
 - the public transport authority (PTA, "Aufgabenträger") for financing / contracting
- Market initiative is prioritary: The new German PT law ("PBefG") defines clear processes for the interaction of the authorities and operators regarding authorisation and contracting (see next slide)
- The authorisation results in a **de facto-exclusive right**
 - * One exemption according to Reg. EC 1370/2007: <u>general</u> obligations regarding tariff don't require a contract.



Awarding PT contracts Authority and operator initiated PT service



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 - 1. Development during contract lifetime
 - 2. Performance monitoring and incentives



Managing PT contracts **Development during the contract**

Some reasons for service changes during contract lifetime

- Demography, settlement structures ...
- Changes in travel patterns, passenger needs
- Budgetary constraints

...

Service changes might be legitimate only if the contract design allows such changes!

Implementation of changes, discussion of changes, potentially adaptation of service level, quality standards, financial consequences

Discussion regarding market development (and regarding appropriate reactions)

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Managing PT contracts

(one of several processes determined in the contract)

Example Berlin – Annual timetable update

- PTA SenStadtUm defines adjusted framework specifications for the timetable (eg. service frequencies, service times, line configurations) consistent with PSO contract
- Municipal transport operator BVG suggests a `rough' time-table draft for every line
- SenStadtUm assesses the drafted timetable based on local transport plans standards
- BVG develops a detailed timetable and applies for the authorisation of the timetable
- SenStadtUm assesses and authorises the detailed timetable



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Managing PT contracts

Service monitoring/quality incentives necessity

The performance of the operator must comply with the stipulations of the contract.

No / bad performance shall not be economically beneficial for the operator \rightarrow appropriate financial incentives

- `Hard' service provision (reliability, punctuality, technical standards)
- 'Soft' service quality (e.g. cleanliness, service quality, staff behaviour, driving style)

Monitoring, reporting, enforcement measures, financial incentives



Managing PT contracts Quality measurement, bonus/penalty system

Controlling of transport performance and quality:

- Operator reports regularly on delivered transport services and achieved qualities
- PTA: completeness / plausibility & sample checks, (access to raw data)
- After final controlling / approval: exact determination of compensation payments



- (Pre-defined) target: Desired status/result/quality of services
- Tolerance range:
- Bonus range':
- Penalty range':
- cap:

Deviations (positive/negative) from the target without bonus or penalty

- A service provision above the tolerance range results in a bonus payment
- e': A service provision under the tolerance range results in a penalty

Negative deviations beyond z% are not accepted; further contractual penalties, ultimately premature termination



Managing PT contracts

Key indicators – example BVG contract (Berlin) 1

Service Level (p.a.)		Quality Level	
•	U-Bahn: 20,44 Mio. Train-km	• Quality criteria, e.g. regularity, punctuality,	
•	Tram: 20,10 Mio. Train-km	connections	
•	Bus 88,64 Mio. Vehicle-km Ferry:	Definition for each criteria	
	18.366 Operating hours	Target values for each criteria	

Compensation Payments (p.a.)

- 85,7 Mio € for transport services,
- 72,0 Mio. € for applying reduced tariffs school transport, elderly, socially deprived
- 194,3 Mio € for infrastructure maintenance, incl. 5,1 Mio € for strengthening security measures

Controlling

- BVG measures its services continuously using both objective data as well as annual costumer surveys
- Data is submitted to CNB for monitoring and validation, calculation bonus / malus
- Data is also used for:
 - Planning purposes
 - Financial planning
 - Reporting to parliament and public

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Managing PT contracts

Key indicators – example BVG contract (Berlin) 2

	Definition	Required Level of Performance
Regularity (objective data)	Scheduled service is operated within the defined operating frequency and max. 10 min after scheduled departure	Target values currently discussed
Punctuality (objective data)	A service is operated in time interval 90 sec before - 210 sec after scheduled departure	Underground: 98.7% Tram: 91.7% Bus: 87.1%
Connecting Services (objective data)	Maximum waiting time for defined connecting services 5 min.	Underground: 99.0% Tram: n.d. Bus: n.d.
Infrastructure (objective data)	Maintaining the quality of the infrastructure so that services can be provided at required level	Underground: < 0.5% Tram: < 0.8% of network subject to speed reduction caused by quality issues
Passenger Satisfaction (surveys)	Target values set for individual criteria $(\rightarrow \text{ next slide})$	Different values per critieria/mode



Managing PT contracts **Key indicators**

Operations

- Reliability
- Punctuality
- Connections

Personnel

- Pleasant driving
- Service, friendliness and appearance of staff



max. -90 Sek. Geplante Abfahrt

ax. +210 Sek

Age



- Comfort: seat number and quality, hand rails
- No breakdowns, damages
- Cleanliness
- Accessibility for PRM: low floor entrance, kneeling, even floors, wheelchair place
- Environmental standards:
 Exhaust gas, noise emissions

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Managing PT contracts **Key indicators**

Passenger Information

General requirements



- Regular info and at least as important in case of irregularity
- Static & dynamic
- Integrated: whole system / area of the transit area, not just for own company

Specific requirements

- Maps, line plans with connections, timetables, tariff information
- Technical standards displays front & in vehicle, colours/contrast, number of lines / characters
- Functioning of displays
- Hotline, Passenger Information App



Managing PT contracts **Key indicators**

Bus stations

- Rain shelter
- Passenger information also static & dynamic, timetable & tariff, integration

Further aspects e.g. social security

- Video surveillance
- Appropriate reaction of drivers in case of emergency
- Ticket control
- Cooperation with police



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Managing PT contracts Classical approaches and current developments

The granting of financial subsidy, exclusivity or other support by the authority to the operator usually compensates for obligations defined by the authority. Control of the discharge of these obligations is necessary!



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Managing PT contracts Classical approaches – limitations



Limitations

- Net cost contract: requirements for effective incentive often not fulfilled
- DPM: useful mostly for reliability, punctuality; less for most other criteria
- MSS high costs; objective definitions in line with passenger perception?
- CSS high costs; attribution of results to lines / operators? Correlation satisfaction with actual quality?
- Standards/incentives fragmented/static
- DPM = direct performance measurement, MSS = mystery shopping, CSS = customer satisfaction survey

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Managing PT contracts Classical approaches, current developments



DPM = direct performance measurement, MSS = mystery

shopping, CSS = customer satisfaction survey

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Contracting | Contract management **Instruments to eliminate the shortcomings of `classical approaches' - examples** Cooperation is so an important file

Cooperation is seen as an important field for improvement!

Instruments (examples)	Application Examples
Performance-based contracts	Stadsregio Amsterdam/The Netherlands
Communication authority-operator regarding the further development of service quality	2. generation of Swedish contracts, many contracts in The Ntetherlands: joint development teams
Agreed actions for achieving high service quality and demand growth	Helsingborg/Sweden, Copenhagen/Denmark Quallity Partnerships (GB)
Incentive for satisfaction of the local authority	Many contracts in The Netherlands
Influence over the management / target agreement	Pforzheim/Germany
Award criteria demand growth / customer orientation	Current considerations in Germany
Customer guarantee	VBN Bremen, VVO Saxony, NVV Kassel/ Germany
Transparency	Pforzheim/Germany and many more
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Thank you.





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